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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
V. No. 950531-CA 
ROBERT G. JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Argument: 1) In the Statement of the Case section of 
the answering brief Ass't AG Beadles states, 
"Defendant . . . told potential investors that they would 
get back twice their investment (R. 44). He further 
informed the potential investors that the scheme was a 
"sure thing." (id.). 
Beadles takes from the Affidavit of Probable Cause, r. 35-50, 
not from the transcript of trial testimony. The evidence at 
trial is to the contrary, i.e., defendant Johnson made no such 
representations nor did he "t[ell]ff or "inform[]" potential 
investors. 
2) In the Summary of the Argument section of the 
answering brief Beadles states, 
"The term "investment contract" has been defined by Utah 
case law since 1983 and federal cases since 1946. Its 
meaning is not vague; rather it has been settled for 
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decades." 
The cases (Utah's Payable Accounting and US Supreme Court's 
Howey) upon which Beadles relies are civil. In State v. 
Pickus, 257 NW 284, 295 (S.D. 1934) the court stated, 
"... whatever the courts may have seen fit to do in the 
field of civil liability for [securities violations] the 
situation with reference to criminal liability for 
[securities violations] must be governed and controlled 
by our statute. . . . [I]f a man] is to be criminally 
held it must be by legislative act and not by judicial 
decision. [The term "investment contract"] in our 
criminal statute has [no] well-recognized meaning. . . 
. It cannot and should not be stretched by judicial 
decision. 
" . . . the Legislature has not [defined "investment 
contract" in the criminal statute]; and where the 
Legislature has not the court cannot." 
Further on in his argument summary Beadles states, 
"Under the doctrine of "stare decisis," which obligates 
courts to follow the decisions of higher courts, this 
Court cannot declare the Utah Supreme Court's definition 
of "investment contract" void. Therefore, defendant's 
request for that relief should be denied." 
Defendant has not asked the Court to "declare the Utah Supreme 
Court's definition of "investment contract" void;" he asks 
only that the statute, applied criminally against him, and 
containing the term "investment contract," the particular 
security the state claims was involved in the charges made 
against him, be declared unconstitutionally vague "as applied" 
to him. 
Even further on in the summary of argument section of the 
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answering brief Beadles states, 
"Defendant stipulated that the investments were 
securities. Given that stipulation, the trial court's 
admission of expert testimony regarding the status of 
the transactions as investment contracts, and therefore, 
securities, was harmless even if error.11 
Defendant did not so stipulate. But Beadles' claim does bring 
us directly to the core mischief in this prosecution, i.e., 
there is no investment contract and no security otherwise is 
present and therefore there can be no securities violation to 
prosecute. There was, therefore, no probable cause to 
commence or continue this prosecution. From the record it 
can only be inferred that the trial judge sensed this. In the 
colloquy at r. 1335-1336, the trial judge, now retired, stated 
to defendant's counsel in the first trial, 
11
. . .and this ends the question of whether or not you 
[the prosecution] have to bring in experts in on 
security. [To Mr. Bottum, now deceased, defendant's 
counsel in the first trial] It's admitted it's a 
security? 
"MR. BOTTUM: Yes." 
There was no reason whatever, from the trial court's 
standpoint, or the defendant's, that such a stipulation should 
be sought or that the defendant's counsel should stipulate to 
have defendant waive the requirement that the state prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense 
charged, especially the core element in a securities 
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violations criminal case, the presence of a security. 
But in this rarest of cases, the stipulation was sought 
by the trial judge, and acceded to by defendant's counsel, in 
the most extremely coercive circumstances possible for a 
defense attorney, i.e., Bottum had been implicated in the same 
charges on which defendant was being tried and he himself 
suffered the threat of prosecution on those charges if he did 
not cooperate with the trial judge and prosecution in assuring 
defendant's conviction, which, of course, came about. And the 
trial judge, as well as the prosecution, fraudulently and 
deceptively, instructed the jury fl[y]ou are instructed that 
the Defendant and his counsel stipulate and agree . . ." r. 
562. The state's retort is that the statute had run and 
therefore attorney Bottum could not be charged at the time of 
the offending stipulation. Defendant knows that the deal was 
made long before the first trial between Bottum and Attorney 
General Van Dam, personally. 
But all this happened before, and related to, the first 
trial. In the second go-around there was no stipulation and 
no instruction as Beadles claims. Facilitated by the bizarre 
doings of trial judge Lyon, defendant was convicted on all 
counts and this appeal resulted. See, for instance, 
Instructon 27, which invokes more than one statutory 
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alternative, each with different elements, without requiring 
that the jury indicate on which of the alternatives it has 
based the defendant's guilt; and then quotes the Howey 
elements of an investment contract with the relevant facts 
unaddressed. 
With such egregious [and criminal] conduct on the part of 
the trial judge and the state's prosecutors, including Van 
Dam, the Court of Appeals, on 14th Amendment Due Process 
grounds, was required to dismiss the prosecution, with 
prejudice, after the first trial. Judges Greenwood, Garff, 
and Russon however, sent the matter back for a new trial 
although at the time they knew, or should have known, that 
there was no probable cause for the first trial. [Opinion at 
823 P.2d 494. ] 
A waiver by defense counsel of defendant's right to have 
the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 
offense charged is ineffective without defendant's knowing 
consent. This was pointed out in defendant's opening brief in 
the first appeal, with authorities, at page -54-. 
Then, in the final paragraph of the argument summary 
section of Beadles' answering brief, the Court is urged to 
"refuse to review defendant's claim of insufficiency because 
he has not even attempted to marshal the evidence." 
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Defendant proceeds under the Due Process protections of 
the 14th Amendment as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307 (1979). The holding there contemplates the "no 
evidence" rule, in other words, as applied to this case, a 
rational juror could not have found the essential element, to-
wit, the presence of a security [investment contract] and 
therefore no sale or purchase of a security, beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there is no evidence of a security in 
the trial (2nd) record. Under the Jackson standard, the 
appellate court reviews the record de novo. Flieger v. Delo, 
16 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1994) Therefore, there is no evidence 
in favor of a finding of "security" or "investment contract" 
to marshal, and under the Jackson standard, there is no 
requirement to marshal the evidence anyway, the appellate 
court must review the entire record. Flieger, supra. 
As in State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 161, (Utah 1989), 
dissent of Justice Stewart, "this is a classically appropriate 
case for application of the manifest error doctrine." Both 
trials were in themselves wholly and totally error, 
constitutional error. The definitional statements of Justice 
Stewart in his dissent may be looked to by those justices 
interested in imparting justice in this case. 
Conclusion: Defendant/appellant requests that this 
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matter be remanded to the trial court with directions to 
dismiss the prosecution for no probable cause; there was no 
security [investment contract] present in the transactions 
described in the evidence and testimony in the second trial; 
the presence of a security, the one specified in the charging 
documents, is a necessary element to be proved in a securities 
violation criminal case. 
Plaintiff/appellee's answering brief is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, and not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, was 
interposed for the purpose of delay, to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, and to gain time that will 
only benefit plaintiff/appellee; and therefore, defendant/ 
appellant requests an award of sanctions of at least $5000.00 
against the State of Utah to be paid by the Attorney General. 
DATED April 14, 1997. 
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